












Michael J. Piore 











Chapter 3 (pp. 21-42) in: 
Essays on Legal and Illegal Immigration 
Susan Pozo, ed. 








Massachusetts Institute of Technology
I began working on migration in 1972 after spending a 
year and a half in Puerto Rico. When I came back to Boston 
at the end of that period it seemed to me that all of a sudden 
there were Puerto Ricans all over Boston. I wasn't sure 
whether that was an illusion on my part that came from a 
sudden, heightened consciousness about Puerto Ricans in 
general, or whether indeed, there had been a new migration 
of Puerto Ricans to Boston. So I began to investigate the 
origins of the Puerto Rican community in Boston.
In the process, I actually found the origins of the Puerto 
Rican community in Boston. I went into one factory where 
the employer pulled off the factory floor a gentleman who 
said he had come to Boston in 1954. I asked him how large 
the Puerto Rican community was in 1954 and he said, "Well 
let me see. There was Juan, Jose ..." and he named eight 
people. But, I also found that the Puerto Rican community 
in Boston, while a lot larger in 1972 than eight people, was 
also not all Puerto Rican. Indeed, a large number of the peo 
ple who claimed to be Puerto Rican, or who at least were 
presented to me as Puerto Rican, actually came from other 
parts of the Spanish speaking Caribbean and many of them 
were in the United States illegally.
At that time immigration was not a very much talked 
about phenomenon, but since then, especially since 1972, it
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has become a focal point of public policy. In the last ten 
years it appears to have gained a permanent place in the 
public policy agenda. We have just gone through a long 
debate over what is the latest piece of immigration legisla 
tion, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. While that legislation was 
defeated, or at least tabled, it is almost certain that there will 
be another piece of immigration legislation in the coming 
Congress. So it is largely to that debate, raised by the im 
migration reform legislation, and in light of a series of 
research projects that began with that study of Puerto Rican 
migration but extended from there to the issue of migration 
in general, that I would like to address my remarks.
The Illegal Immigration Problem
The central concern in the public debate has largely been 
clandestine immigration. Estimates of the number of people 
in the country without proper documents range from 3 to 12 
million. 1 Interestingly enough, those figures the 3 and the 
12 million have remained constant over the ten-year 
period. Most of these people are here to work, hence the no 
tion that they take jobs from Americans. The rhetoric of the 
immigration debate implies that, in addition, the existence of 
so many people here in direct contradiction to announced 
public policy, represents a threat to the general social order 
and hence to the safety and security of the rest of us. Their 
ambiguous legal status certainly places the people themselves 
in a precarious social position. It makes it difficult to 
educate their children, to obtain the protection of labor 
legislation in the workplace, or off the job to obtain protec 
tion from the abuses of landlords, moneylenders or the 
wrath of angry relatives and neighbors or rejected suitors, all 
of whom can at any moment in time turn them in to the im 
migration authorities.
The dominant view about this immigration appears to be 
that the immigrants are driven by a desperate attempt to
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escape the poverty and depression of their own countries, 
which constitutes an inexorable force driving them towards 
the United States. This view is not always made explicit but it 
underlies the continual reference to the economic conditions 
in places like Mexico, to the population pressures in the 
underdeveloped world, and to the high unemployment rates 
or so-called underemployment in these areas. Given the fact 
that the United States is surrounded by poverty, it implies 
that we will be inundated with immigrants. When figures 
about income levels and population growth along our 
southern border are presented in combination with the 
figures about the numbers of clandestine immigrants already 
here, it seems that we are already being inundated.
Alternative Policies to Control 
Illegal Immigration
This notion of the immigration process invites a policy of 
massive retaliation. To halt the invasion in this way, one 
would have to control the two major streams of clandestine 
immigration. One of those streams consists of people who 
enter without inspection, that is, basically, cross the border. 
The second group consists of a group called "visa violators'* 
who enter with documents, largely tourist documents but 
some student visas, and then violate the conditions of those 
visas either by working while they are here or by staying after 
the visas have expired.
Border Control: In principle, true border control is prob 
ably possible. The U.S.-Mexican border is very long, but 
most of it consists of desert which is difficult to cross and 
easy to police with aerial equipment. Most of the entry oc 
curs in large urban areas. The present border control force is 
small. As the former Labor Secretary, Ray Marshall, was 
fond of pointing out, the border patrol, in fact, is smaller 
than the Capitol Hill police force. Current smuggling opera 
tions are relatively primitive and unorganized. More
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resources alone would go a long way to counter those opera 
tions.
On the other hand, the whole nature of the immigration 
process undoubtedly changes under the impact of a massive 
control operation. There would be an escalation both in the 
technology and the organizational efforts on the other side 
of the border and probably a change in the locus of entry. 
Border patrol would thus undoubtedly be considerably more 
expensive than it appears to be at the current time. The final 
cost in terms of resources, not to mention human rights, 
could be quite large. But in my own judgment, if the control 
activity were done with a well-conceived and carefully im 
plemented organizational structure, that is to say, if it were 
not done in panic, it could probably be pulled off.
Visa Controls: Visa violations, on the other hand, are a 
good deal more difficult to control. Almost all visa violators 
come to the United States for ostensibly legitimate reasons: 
to visit relatives, for tourism, shopping and for education. 
Attempts to curtail visa violations by tightening up the pro 
cedures through which visas are granted inevitably interfere 
with these processes in very serious ways. The consulates 
who issue visas are overworked and understaffed and could 
easily absorb more resources. But it is not clear that more 
resources alone would solve this problem. Resource con 
straints seem, in fact, to be one of the major factors control 
ling the number of visas actually issued at the moment. More 
resources would probably make the process fairer, but might 
actually increase the flow. It is very difficult to judge the ac 
tual motivation of an applicant, and since many of those 
who eventually violate their visas have legitimate reasons for 
visiting the United States and may not even contemplate visa 
violation in advance, it is not clear that the process could be 
fully controlled in this way. I think it is important to note 
that a lot of students who end up violating their visas really 
do come here for education and change their minds only
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after they get here about whether or not they want to stay. 
That's probably even more true of visitors who come from 
foreign countries to visit friends and relatives and then 
somehow stay longer than they intended, getting a job to 
finance their extended stay.
Employer Controls: The difficulties of direct control, the 
hopelessness of controlling visa violation, and the cost of 
border control have forced attention on a third pro 
posal employer liability. By a quirk in the immigration 
legislation employers are in no way responsible for checking 
the legal status of their employees. Reformers have 
argued and this is one of the central provisions of virtually 
every bill that has been proposed, including the Simpson- 
Mazzoli bill that if employers were made responsible for 
verifying the legal working status of employees, the jobs 
which are the chief attraction for the immigrants would be 
cut off, and immigration would dry up.
It is probably true that this would be the case, but job con 
trol is no panacea. The exact nature of present employers' 
liability has been somewhat distorted by the advocates of this 
reform. Employers are not, it is true, liable for having un 
documented workers on their payroll, but they are liable if 
they actively and knowingly engage in recruitment. Such 
recruitment has at times been fairly widespread although 
very circumspect. The immigration service has not been very 
successful in developing cases against this kind of recruit 
ment, largely because such cases are difficult to prove 
without extensive investigation which the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) does not have the resources to 
conduct. More stringent forms of liability would reduce the 
investigative burden, but only marginally.
For really effective enforcement, employers would have to 
have some means of verifying the status of the job applicant. 
This would necessitate a national identity card which poses
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apparently insurmountable civil rights problems. Such a 
system would also be very expensive. Budget estimates run to 
several billions of dollars. By themselves, therefore, 
employer sanctions are unlikely to have much of an effect 
one way or another. To be effective they would require a 
massive infusion of resources for the immigration service. 
These resources would be almost as effective under present 
legislation if they were devoted to investigations and Im 
migration and Naturalization Service raids of existing 
employers, but we have consistently judged the cost of all 
these activities to be too great. Thus, there is a sense in which 
the flood of immigrants, which the conventional view 
predicts, seems inevitable. American culture seems doomed 
to either drown in a sea of foreign languages and alien 
customs, or to degenerate as the immigrants drive down our 
standard of living and we divert increasing resources to 
securing our borders and make progressive compromises on 
our basic human values in order to keep aliens out.
Fortunately, however, there is very little evidence to sup 
port the theory which underlies the conventional wisdom. It 
seems logical that the income gap between the United States 
and the underdeveloped world should be the basic governor 
of the immigration process. But that does not, in fact, seem 
to be the case. The migrants are not coming from the poorest 
countries in the world and they are not coming from the 
poorest regions in their countries of origin. This remains true 
even when some effort is made to correct the figures for the 
cost of transportation or even information about job pro 
spects. Mexican migrants to the United States, for example, 
come from places like Jalisco in the middle of the country 
and from Mexico City, not from the relatively poor Yucatan. 
The poorest country in the Western Hemisphere is Haiti. It 
has been the poorest for many, many years, but until quite 
recently Haiti was not a principal source of migrant workers 
and historically and to a lesser extent even now, the Haitian
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migration is primarily composed of the relatively well-to-do 
and well-educated middle class.
Conventional Migration Theory Fails to Explain 
Present and Past Rates of Immigration
Any theory of migration must explain its timing. The cur 
rent wave of clandestine migration is recent. It dates from 
the late 1960s. A large income differential between the 
United States and the countries of origin has, however, 
always existed and if anything has probably been narrowing 
over the last ten years. Nor is it possible to account for the 
recent migration flows through other changes in the cost dif 
ferential. Transportation costs, for example, have been 
remarkably stable over long periods of time. The cost of air 
transportation from the Caribbean in the early 1970s (and 
that's the period when immigration seems to have really 
begun) is approximately the same percentage of the unskilled 
worker's weekly wage as the cost of steamship passage from 
Italy in the 1880s.
Insofar as I can judge from talking to immigrants, the im 
migration process does not work as the conventional wisdom 
presumes because the potential immigrants view the United 
States much as Americans view the immigrants. The im 
migrants are deeply attached to their language and culture 
and strongly rooted in their own communities where they 
feel comfortable and at home. They find American society 
cold and alien, strange, lonely and frightening. Their migra 
tion is thus not a sign of the special attraction of the United 
States, but paradoxically of a commitment to their home 
community. Generally, they have some particular project at 
home which motivates the migration process: Landholdings 
which they would like to expand or improve, agricultural 
equipment or livestock they plan to purchase, an interurban 
taxi or hack, a small store, in some areas a piece of industrial 
equipment for a home factory. Their notion is to come to the
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United States temporarily, work hard for a relatively short 
period of time, and then return home using the accumulated 
earnings to finance their project. 2
This, incidently, is true not just of the current migration, 
but it has been true historically as well. Late nineteenth cen 
tury migrants from southern and eastern Europe seem to 
have come from areas of small land holdings where projects 
to expand or improve agriculture were widespread among 
the peasantry. The rates of return or rate of emigration 
among these early migrants were quite high, overall 32 per 
cent of all immigrants between 1908 and 1910 (a period for 
which we have complete figures) returned. 3 For some groups 
the rate was much higher. Sixty-three percent of northern 
Italian migrants to the United States and 56 percent of the 
southern Italians, for example, went home in that period. 
The fact that immigrants are motivated in this way limits the 
range of jobs for which employers find them attractive. 
They're not attractive for jobs to which adult national 
workers normally aspire. Such jobs require a long-term com 
mitment on the part of the labor force, high levels of educa 
tion, training and experience, and a stable regular labor 
force commitment.
The Secondary Labor Market 
As an Explanation for Immigration
Thus, the immigration process tends to be governed by, 
and respond to what we call the secondary sector of the labor 
market jobs which are relatively low paying, insecure, have 
menial social status, and lack any career advancement. Such 
work is not attractive to committed national workers precise 
ly because it has no future and adds little to the self- 
definition and esteem of those who perform it. The im 
migrants are undeterred by these same characteristics 
because they view their stay as temporary. They plan to leave
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before they are laid off. They do not think of themselves as 
staying long enough to take advantage of career oppor 
tunities and they obtain their self-definition from the work 
they perform at home. Since it is the jobs in the secondary 
sector for which migrants are an attractice source of labor, it 
is these jobs which control the immigration process.
We do not know why the economy generates secondary 
jobs. A good many of the jobs which clandestine immigrants 
now hold were previously held by other migrant groups: 
first, by foreign immigrants from southern and eastern 
Europe and subsequently black workers migrating from the 
rural south. The new immigration dates from the late 1960s 
when unemployment, under the impact of the Vietnam War 
boom, reached extremely low levels. In this period, the labor 
reserves in the rural south were virtually exhausted and the 
black labor force became dominated by a second generation 
which had grown up in the cities. Case study evidence sug 
gests that this new generation, whose attitudes were crystaliz- 
ed by the civil rights movement, were increasingly perceived 
by employers as intractable and difficult, if not actually 
dangerous, to manage. 4 Faced with a general labor shortage 
and a great distrust of the existing workforce, businessmen 
thus began to look around for new sources of labor and they 
found them increasingly among foreign workers. In a 
number of cases the employer's efforts seemed to have been 
deliberate and purposeful, but they went largely unnoticed as 
policy focused on obtaining higher levels of jobs for blacks. 
In some cases businesses actually seemed to have recruited 
from abroad, and this was the origin of the new migration 
stream.
The character of an immigration stream does not, 
however, remain static. It changes significantly over time. 
Most early immigrants plan to stay only temporarily, but 
many end up staying longer than they intended. Some of
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them eventually settle permanently in the United States. 
Even those who finally do return often have children who 
grow up in the United States, cut off from their parents' 
country without the cultural and linguistic ties that bind their 
parents to the place of origin. The long-stayers and their 
children form a permanent settlement whose members, 
especially in the second generation, have needs and aspira 
tions which parallel those of the U.S. nationals. Indeed, for 
practical purposes, many are U.S. nationals whatever their 
legal status. Return is not a viable option.
Once a permanent community forms in the United States 
the character of the new migrants also begins to change. It 
becomes feasible to move to the United States and settle per 
manently without experiencing the cultural alienation and 
strangeness which deters this kind of migration in the begin 
ning and more people begin to do so. Thus, an immigration 
process which begins initially as essentially complementary 
to the needs and aspiration of U.S. nationals generates over 
time a second generation and a growing group of first 
generation immigrants who are in competition with 
American nationals for stable career jobs.
Where are we in this process at this time? If the recent 
wave of immigration began in the late 1960s, it is now almost 
20 years later. The country has accumulated a substantial 
reserve of undocumented immigrants and the original fluid 
immigration stream has begun to solidify. Most of the public 
discussion seems to presume that this is the case. People talk 
as if time alone makes this problem more and more pressing. 
But here too, this is by no means clear. The initial upsurge of 
immigration in the late 1960s was a response to two factors: 
an unusually tight labor market with levels of unemployment 
much lower than any experienced since, and a relatively sud 
den shift in the character of the black labor force, who had 
previously been staffing secondary jobs. The vacuum that 
this created at the bottom of the labor market, into which the
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new immigrants were pulled, could not have been greatly ex 
panded since that time and with rising unemployment may 
actually have shrunk. In the last five years there has also 
been a substantial infusion of refugees. The refugees have 
moved into jobs very comparable to those held by un 
documented migrants. But, the refugees have a permanent 
commitment to the U.S. which the migrants do not and un 
doubtedly push many of the migrants out. However settled 
the original migrant communities have become, we know 
from case studies and anecdotal evidence that the numbers 
who are temporarily here, remain substantial. 3 Because these 
people are here to save money they are not interested in 
waiting out unemployment. They do not stay in the United 
States. If jobs are unavailable they go home. Indeed, as one 
migrant commented, "It is not worth my while to stay here if 
I can't hold at least two jobs." At their core, the immigrant 
communities may now be sufficiently solid to resist the 
pressure of unemployment and the competition of the 
refugees, but there is still a wide periphery of workers who 
must have responded to the changing economic conditions 
and the new competition by leaving the United States.
Economic troubles in Mexico are thought to be augment 
ing undocumented migration, but this presumption is also 
dubious. Nobody seems to have argued during the Mexican 
oil boom of the late 1970s that the undocumented migration 
from that country diminished. If the boom did not diminish 
the migration, it is unclear why the bust should augment it. 
However bad things are in Mexico, one can probably do bet 
ter there surrounded by a family and embedded in a com 
munity network than in the United States without a job and 
ineligible for unemployment insurance or social welfare. In 
any case, much of the argument applies to economic refugees 
from Mexico, as it does to political refugees from Cuba, 
Asia, and El Salvador. To the extent that they have a 
stronger motive to stay in the United States, they're likely to
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replace temporary migrants from other countries in the 
hemisphere. This displacement effect undoubtedly operates 
least effectively in the West where Mexicans predominate, 
but strongly in the Midwest and the East Coast where Mex 
icans are only one of an immense number of different na 
tional groups which make up the immigrant population.
Finally, what is almost never recognized in assessing the 
evolution of the clandestine immigration population is that a 
very large proportion of those people who do settle per 
manently manage to legitimize their status. The official im 
migration system in the United States operates through a 
system of equity, or preference, to give enormous weight to 
family reunification. The spouse, parents, and the children 
under the age of 21 of U.S. citizens are admitted outside the 
official immigration quotas. The preference system allocates 
20 percent of the overall quota of 270,000 immigrants to un 
married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, 26 percent to 
unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens, 
10 percent to married sons and daughters of citizens and 24 
percent to brothers and sisters of citizens. Very few people 
develop a desire to settle permanently in an area without 
developing the social and family ties which would eventually 
qualify them for a permanent immigration visa under one or 
another of these various family unification provisions. In ad 
dition, the wives or husbands of U.S. citizens come in out 
side the quota system altogether. Most visa violators come to 
the United States as family visitors with exactly the kinds of 
ties which would permit them to legitimize their status initial 
ly. It is common practice for undocumented aliens to apply 
for official admission, come to the United States, live and 
work clandestinely while their application is pending, and 
then return home when it comes through to pick it up at the 
office. In this way, documented and undocumented migra 
tion are intertwined and the pool of undocumented workers 
is continually diminished by official migration.
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The estimates of the stock of undocumented migrants 
have, as I said at the beginning, remained constant. That is, 
the range has always been three to twelve million over the 
whole course of this debate. It is generally supposed that this 
is due to the width of the range and that the true figure has 
moved up over time. Given rising unemployment, the com 
petition of refugees, and the processes of legitimization 
through official immigration, however, the true figure might 
as well have actually declined. It is in the nature of this pro 
cess that we can never know what the true figure is because, 
obviously, clandestine migrants are not volunteering infor 
mation about their presence in the United States.
Immigrant and Native Workers: Two Case Studies
What does this alternative view of immigration imply for 
public policy? The major concern of public policymakers is 
the threat which immigration poses to income and employ 
ment opportunities of American nationals. In the conven 
tional understanding, the immigrants constitute a generaliz 
ed threat. In the process just sketched out, the threat is much 
more limited and confined. The immigrants, at least in the 
early stages of the process, do not threaten the employment 
opportunities of permanent adult workers, particularly those 
in jobs requiring a long-term career commitment. Indeed, in 
sofar as a certain amount of menial, unskilled and unsecured 
workers are necessary to sustain stable, long-term job oppor 
tunities, the immigrants may actually complement these 
types of national workers. The competition occurs between 
the immigrants and other marginally committed labor force 
groups, particularly youth and secondary women workers 
whose primary commitment is to home and family respon 
sibilities. Even that kind of competition is difficult to assess. 
The nature of the labor force commitment of these groups is 
in itself ambiguous. The jobs at stake are, moreover, in com-
34 International Migration
petition with foreign producers and any attempt to replace 
the immigrant labor force with nationals might simply drive 
the work abroad.
The difficulties for analysis and policy are illustrated by 
two studies of New York City industries, one by Thomas 
Baily (1985) of the New York City restaurant industry, the 
second by Roger Waldinger (1985) of the New York City gar 
ment industry.
The Restaurant Industry: In the restaurant industry, im 
migrants tend to be concentrated in a distinct sector of ethnic 
restaurants owned and managed by immigrant en 
trepreneurs. This sector coexists with two other sectors the 
fast food sector typified by McDonald's, which is staffed 
primarily with young part-time workers, and full service 
restaurants owned by American nationals who employ some 
immigrants but also a certain number of nationals. Baily 
argues, on the basis of a comparison with other cities which 
have much smaller immigrant groups, that the competition 
between immigrants and nationals is not a direct one, but oc 
curs through the relative sizes of these different sectors. 
Without the immigrants, he argues, the fast food sector 
would be much larger, McDonald's would substitute for the 
Greek coffee shop at the bottom of the price line, and limited 
menu steakhouses would substitute at the top. This is partial 
ly a substitution of youth for immigrant labor. However, a 
good deal of the fast food operation is industrial. The food 
and equipment are prepared in remote manufacturing 
establishments. These establishments tend to offer relatively 
unskilled jobs which are accessible to immigrants. These jobs 
have schedules and locations which are not attractive to the 
youth. The manufacturing activities can, moreover, be easily 
performed abroad. Clearly, the jobs lost by immigrants 
would not be converted to youth restaurant jobs on a one- 
for-one basis. It is not completely clear that youth could be 
attracted to fill every new restaurant job created by curtail-
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ing immigration. The restaurants in the nonimmigrant cities 
which Baily examined have a dispersed population and a 
largely family clientele. They are located near the youth 
which they employ. New York City restaurants have a pro 
fessional and business clientele in the center city, remote 
from the residence of young workers.
The Garment Industry: Employment patterns in the gar 
ment industry are equally complicated and ambiguous. 
Waldinger argues that the industry in New York also caters 
to a particular segment of the national market. It concen 
trates upon the production of short runs of specialty items 
for a spot market. It therefore needs the large flexible 
sources of labor which the immigrants provide. The im 
migrant communities also provide a certain skill continuity 
which is otherwise difficult to maintain and which is par 
ticularly important given the type of production in which the 
city specializes. Outside the city, production is of a very dif 
ferent sort. It consists of much longer runs of the products 
which are more standard and/or are ordered in advance. For 
example, highly stylized dresses are produced in New York 
City, while more standardized items such as blue jeans are 
produced elsewhere in long-run operations. The first order 
of standardized garments for the season will be produced 
outside New York. But there will be last minute spot orders 
which need to be filled on short notice. These are generally 
produced in New York itself along with specialized orders. 
The long-run type of production was originally done in New 
York, but because it requires fewer skills, benefits from large 
production facilities, and supports the time delays involved 
in remote production, it moved out of the city during the 
postwar decades, first to rural areas in the U.S., and then 
abroad.
With the new immigration, some long-run production has 
come back to New York City. It is difficult to imagine the 
garment industry without a fashion center like New York
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and the spot market segment of the industry which resides 
there. New York's chief American competitors are Miami 
and Los Angeles, both of which use a similar immigrant 
labor force. Without any immigrants the whole industry 
might move abroad. The recent return of long-run produc 
tion to New York City has been, at the expense, in part, of 
farm wives in rural Pennsylvania, upstate New York, and the 
south, and in this case the immigrants do compete with 
American nationals. But it has also been at the expense of 
foreign production, and the domestic production which 
moved to New York might otherwise have moved to those 
foreign locations. The significance of the jobs lost to the 
farm wives is also debatable. Before the factories moved into 
these areas, most of these women had never considered 
working. The rural labor force was a creation of the 
employers, in much the same way the immigration labor 
force in the city is the product of employer recruiting.
To summarize, it is not clear that prohibiting the employ 
ment of immigrants in these industries would necessarily in 
crease employment of native workers. Immigrants readily 
substitute for a marginally committed and less skilled labor 
force. Employers appear reluctant to hire the mostly younger 
and less skilled native workers. It is likely that reducing the 
availability of foreign workers would only induce these 
employers to relocate their firms abroad.
Policy Prescriptions
Taken together, these considerations lead me to conclude 
that the concern which has motivated current legislative pro 
posals is misplaced and the legislation itself is ill-conceived. 
We ought, I would argue, nontheless, make an effort to limit 
and control the immigration process. The reason for doing 
so is that over a very long period of time immigration does 
have the capacity to erode the employment opportunities of 
national workers, and because generally, a tight labor
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market in which labor is in short supply is more conducive to 
social progress than a loose one.
Limit Immigration by Improving Working Conditions: 
The best way to limit immigration, however, is by direct con 
trol over employment conditions, by raising wages and im 
proving working conditions of the jobs to which immigrants 
are attracted in the hope that this will eventually attract na 
tional workers in their place. Policy instruments for doing 
this are available in our labor standards legislation and the 
National Labor Relations Act. I would, therefore, rather 
devote the resources we are currently talking about diverting 
to the enforcement of immigration legislation to enforce 
ment of these pieces of labor legislation, and legislate 
reforms which would raise the minimum wage, facilitate 
union organization, tighten health and safety standards, and 
the like. I prefer this policy to tighter immigration policy 
because, in general, I think it is more humane more consis 
tent with the preservation of and respect for human 
rights to control jobs rather than to control people.
I also think that the immigration debate tends to become 
entangled in feelings of xenophobia and racism, which 
obscure the underlying economic interest at stake. As a 
result, we are systematically led to pass legislation, which 
when we see what its true economic costs are, we are unwill 
ing to enforce. A debate which focuses on the minimum 
wage and labor standards legislation makes these costs much 
more salient in the public policy debate. I take it as axiomatic 
that if we are unwilling to support legislation which directly 
raises the cost of labor we will be unwilling to enforce im 
migration legislation which has the effect of doing this in 
directly by removing the foreign labor force. It is a consistent 
part of this policy not only to enforce labor standards direct 
ly, but also to combine that kind of enforcement with en 
forcement of immigration legislation through periodic in-
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spection of establishments known to employ clandestine im 
migrants so as to regularly vacate the jobs, open them up to 
nationals and test their desirability. The decent way to do 
this would be to inspect worker documents and inform the 
employer of all employees without proper documents and to 
hold the employer liable if he continues to hire these people 
in the future.
Do Not Use Immigration Reform to Solve Basic Economic 
and Social Problems: On the other hand, it would be a great 
mistake to see in the control of immigration a solution to any 
of our basic economic and social problems. This seems ob 
vious to me with respect to the high levels of unemployment 
we are currently experiencing, although, given the rhetoric 
surrounding the policy debate, this point is perhaps worth 
emphasizing. Current unemployment is the product of a 
deep and prolonged economic recession combined with long- 
term structural adjustments in the technology and interna 
tional competitive position of our major industries. The in 
creases in unemployment have concentrated among precisely 
those committed adult male workers who are not in competi 
tion with immigrants. And the low-wage, unstable, menial 
jobs which the immigrants hold will not substitute for the 
jobs these people have lost. The immigrant jobs might, it is 
true, ease the adjustment process of the displaced workers if 
they were willing to take them, but few of the displaced 
workers are going to be willing to accept the humiliation of 
such a major decline in social status for the small income in 
volved. The real solution to their problems will require both 
an economic recovery that is sustained and long lasting and 
training and relocation assistance to help permanently 
displaced workers find a dignified place within the economy.
I think it is worth emphasizing that the immigrants only 
accept these jobs because they think of them as temporary 
and because they hold them in a place so remote from the 
place in which they actually think of themselves as per-
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manently located and in which their own self-identity is an 
chored. A similar point can be made with respect to black 
youth. A number of the jobs now held by immigrants were 
once held by the black nationals. If the immigrants were to 
somehow disappear, black Americans would again take over 
some of their work. The immigrants, however, did not 
displace blacks. Employers perceived a change in black at 
titudes toward the work which made them difficult to 
manage, and recruited migrants to replace them. Black at 
titudes changed because an older generation, raised in the 
rural south with a background and motivations similar to the 
immigrants of today, was replaced by a new generation who 
grew up in northern urban areas. These younger workers 
associated the jobs with the inferior social status to which 
their race had been condemned in the United States and 
feared that they would be confined in them permanently 
through prejudice and discrimination. This process of 
replacement occurred almost 20 years ago in a much tighter 
labor market and at a time when both the political climate 
and the levels of welfare and social benefits were much more 
conducive to these attitudes than they are today. It is likely 
that black resistance to such work has moderated somewhat 
and this is the case for pressing to reopen some of these jobs. 
But, neither I nor, more important, the businessmen involv 
ed believe that the attitudes have changed substantially. The 
real solution to the employment problem of blacks requires 
not the regaining of menial, low-wage jobs, but upward 
mobility into high-wage, dignified work.
Do Not Interfere Directly with the Settlement of Im 
migrant Communities: Finally, precisely because of the ex 
perience with the black revolt in the 1960s, it would be a 
great mistake to attempt to control immigration by directly 
forestalling settlement. The black movement was essentially 
the revolt of second generation immigrants a revolt of the 
children of a generation who had come out of the south who
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were no longer satisfied with their parents' jobs, but who did 
not have access to the high wages and career advancement 
which might have satisfied their aspirations. Prejudice and 
discrimination were undoubtedly major factors blocking 
their advancement, but the black youth of the 1960s were 
also poorly trained for the positions to which they aspired. 
The children of the new immigrants will undoubtedly view 
their parents' jobs in much the same way and may react in 
much the same way if their own advancement is similarly 
blocked. Any attempt to prevent their parents from settling 
permanently will bar the children access to the educational 
and cultural facilities which will enable them to fulfill their 
aspirations and recreate for another major portion of our 
population the social tensions which have surrounded black 
communities in the last 20 years.
In a sense, moreover, American society has a moral 
obligation to these children as well. They are here because we 
wanted the labor of their parents. In a very real sense, we 
recruited their parents. By so doing we made the children like 
us, probably more like us in terms of values and aspirations, 
culture and language, than their parents. Having done so, we 
have an obligation to treat them as we would treat our own 
children. If, in the process, we create competitors for our 
children, this may be an argument for more careful control 
of the use of immigrant labor in the secondary sector, but is 
is not a very strong argument for limiting the after effects of 
that immigration by pressing on the children who, like us, 
have nowhere else to go.
Conclusions
Rejection of the conventional policy alternatives need not 
imply that we accept the settlement of immigrants as in 
evitable and beyond our control. To the contrary, the im 
migration process can be limited by a variety of means. 
Higher wages in the secondary sector would attract nationals
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to jobs generally held by immigrants and thus make un 
necessary the active recruitment of workers from abroad. 
Demand for immigrants on the part of employers is an im 
portant explanation for the continued stock of un 
documented workers. Furthermore, increased wages would 
enable temporary immigrants to meet their target earnings 
more rapidly and return home before they develop perma 
nent attachments in the United States. The longer the 
residence of the immigrant the more likely he or she will 
develop attachments and hence the more likely temporary 
residency will become permanent.
Changing the current visa policy may reduce permanent 
immigration. Time limitations on visitors in the form of 
visas, paradoxically, encourage longer stays and cause many 
visitors to remain permanently, albeit illegally, in the United 
States. This results because visa violators delay returning 
home when their visas expire for fear they will not be permit 
ted entry into the United States again. Replacing temporary 
visas with permanent visas could reduce permanent settle 
ment by permitting visitors to return home without fear of 
being barred from entering the United States in the future.
Higher wages and altered visa policies are all a good deal 
more humane and less costly than the policies contemplated 
in the current legislative debate. I believe these will ultimate 
ly be more effective in preserving the economic and spiritual 
values of American life.
NOTES
1. For a discussion about the derivation of these estimates see Corwin 
(1984).
2. For extensive discussion about the motives of immigrants see Piore 
(1979).
3. Immigration Commission (1911), p. 182, Table 16.
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4. For a discussion about these perceptions see Piore (1969).
5. For a discussion and citations see Piore (1979).
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